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Quantum key distribution (QKD) takes advantage of fundamental properties of quantum physics
to allow two distant parties to share a secret key; however, QKD is hampered by a distance limitation
of a few hundred kilometers on earth. The most immediate solution for global coverage is to use
a satellite, which can receive separate QKD transmissions from two or more ground stations and
act as a trusted node to link these ground stations. In this article, we report a system capable of
performing QKD in the high loss regime expected in an uplink to a satellite using weak coherent
pulses and decoy states. Such a scenario profits from the simplicity of its receiver payload, but has
so far considered to be infeasible due to very high transmission losses (40 - 50 dB). The high loss is
overcome by implementing an innovative photon source and advanced timing analysis. Our system
handles up to 57 dB photon loss in the infinite key limit, confirming the viability of the satellite
uplink scenario. We emphasize that while this system was designed with a satellite uplink in mind,
it could just as easily overcome high losses on any free space QKD link.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most success-
ful application to arise thus far from quantum informa-
tion theory [1, 2], but it carries the drawback of a dis-
tance limitation [3–12]: even with future advances, no
more than 400 km of direct transmission in optical fibers
is expected. However, quantum repeaters and satellites
both have the potential to enable worldwide quantum
communication. The former is very appealing with re-
cent promising results [13], but is still in the fundamental
research stage. Satellite QKD, by contrast, is achievable
by today’s satellite and quantum technologies, which al-
ready have the required performance [14]. In the most
feasible scenario, the satellite acts as a trusted node and
performs consecutive key distributions to two different
ground stations allowing a symmetric key sharing be-
tween any two locations [15]. Both a downlink and uplink
of photons from/to a satellite have been considered to
transmit quantum keys, including much work on daylight
and nighttime free space links [16, 17]. The downlink is
expected to experience lower attenuation, since the up-
link beam is much more affected by atmospheric turbu-
lence [14]. Nonetheless, an uplink may be more practical
since it keeps the complex and power-hungry source of
photons on the ground, and permits the use of state-of-
the-art sources such as weak coherent pulses, heralded or
entangled photons, single photon emitters, and possibly
quantum memories. With respect to satellite technology,
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the uplink is beneficial due to looser telescope-pointing
requirements, less demanding opto-mechanics (no preci-
sion coupling or fibers), and lower data processing needs.
Additionally, all required components for the receiver
have flown in space, most notably single-photon detectors
[18]. However, the channel loss in an uplink is estimated
to be above 40 dB, beyond the capability of current QKD
systems, and generally deemed impossible. A free space
QKD experiment over 144 km [9] has been performed in
2007, simulating the conditions for a satellite downlink,
featuring a large 1 m receiver telescope and a modest
30 dB loss. Experiments have also been performed in
optical fiber up to 55 dB channel loss [19], employing su-
perconducting single photon detectors whose cryogenic
temperatures are impractical for a small space-based re-
ceiver. Here we show that a QKD uplink in a loss regime
beyond 40 dB is indeed feasible by implementing a pho-
tonic system which includes an innovative photon source,
advanced timing analysis, and commercial single photon
detectors with the highest overall figure of merit [20].
Our system can perform QKD based on weak coherent
pulses and decoy states up to 57 dB total loss (channel
+ receiver loss) in the infinite key limit [21], and has the
potential to overcome finite size effects on a single satel-
lite passage [22]. Our approach could be implemented
immediately in a satellite mission.
In support of our experimental work, we have per-
formed a rigorous analysis of channel performance for
satellite uplinks and downlinks, including diffraction, at-
mospheric turbulence in the Hufnagel-Valley model [23],
pointing error, atmospheric absorption [24], multiphoton
statistics, telescopic losses, detector efficiencies, satellite
orbit statistics, and background noise, to produce secure
key rate statistics for a variety of conditions and systems.
As a specific example, for an uplink to a satellite 600 km
high, using a 25 cm diameter telescope on the ground
and 30 cm on the satellite, our model shows about 80%
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2of total satellite passages over the ground station will be
usable for QKD asymptotically (infinite key limit), with
an average total loss of 52 dB, an order of magnitude
beyond the capability of current QKD systems.
II. TECHNOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
SATELLITE TRANSMISSION
The most obvious challenge in a satellite uplink is
the sheer link distance: it can be 500 km to more than
30,000 km depending on the satellite orbit, making the
quantum channel extremely lossy. Additionally, noise
due to detector dark counts and stray light, especially
moonlight and terrestrial light, will make satellite QKD
more demanding. Finally, the short duration of each
satellite passage, on the order of hundreds of seconds,
makes proving security of QKD difficult, given the small
number of quantum signals received. To address the chal-
lenges of a satellite uplink, both physical and technical
parameters must be tuned. The first variable that can
be chosen to minimize loss is the wavelength of the pho-
tons. Beam spread due to diffraction is one of the main
sources of loss and is proportional to wavelength, so short
wavelength photons are preferred. After considering the
optical transmission of the atmosphere and single pho-
ton detector capabilities, a good choice is λ = 532 nm,
which enables the use of thin silicon avalanche photodi-
odes [25]. This type of detector has the highest figure
of merit for single photon quantum information appli-
cations [20], based on efficiency, timing jitter and dark
count rate. In order to limit background noise, the sys-
tem must employ short pulses and temporally precise de-
tection which allow temporal filtering of received signals.
The optimization of this temporal filtering is described
below. Furthermore, a high system clock rate is impor-
tant to generate enough signals to account for statistical
fluctuations in estimation of an eavesdropper’s informa-
tion (finite size effects). As a final consideration, the
QKD system must have phase randomization such that
subsequent pulses share no phase relation, which is as-
sumed in security proofs to limit information given to an
eavesdropper.
III. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Our weak coherent pulse decoy-state system satisfies
all the above requirements through the sum-frequency
generation, or up-conversion method of photon produc-
tion in a χ(2) nonlinear crystal. The design and imple-
mentation are illustrated in Fig. 1. To provide short
pulses and fast modulation, light from a mode-locked
titanium sapphire laser at 810 nm is combined in two
type-I Periodically-Poled KTP crystals with light from a
1550 nm continuous-wave laser to produce, due to en-
ergy conservation, photons at 532 nm. The arrange-
ment is equivalent to an asymmetric down-conversion
entanglement source run in reverse [26], and uses two
orthogonally-oriented PPKTP crystals, for polarization-
insensitive up-conversion. The source employs phase pre-
compensation using birefringent wedges in the 810 nm
beam to compensate for temporal walkoff in the PPKTP
crystals. The pulsed 810 nm beam is set to 45◦ polariza-
tion (coherent superposition of horizontal and vertical),
while the 1550 nm pump light is modulated in polar-
ization (qubit state) and intensity (signal or decoy). In
this configuration, the output pulses at 532 nm follow the
pulse length of the 810 nm laser and the polarization and
amplitude of the modulated 1550 nm beam. The modula-
tion is accomplished with off-the-shelf telecom waveguide
modulators, which show high stability and switching con-
trast, and switching speeds of a few GHz. The power of
the two input beams is controlled such that the output
pulses at 532 nm contain around one photon per pulse,
as determined by the optimal average photon number for
decoy-state QKD. The phase randomization is also ac-
complished with the telecom laser, whose coherence time
(∼5 ns) is less than the period between adjacent pulses
emitted from the mode-locked laser.
The up-converted photons are collected into single
mode fiber, then Alice splits off some photons with a
99:1 fiber beamsplitter for source characterization. The
light is allowed to exit at the fiber tip to the quantum
channel, then passes through an adjustable lens to con-
trol the beam size at Bob’s receiver and therefore the
channel loss. Bob’s lens selects a small portion of the
beam to simulate a high loss channel to space. Bob
performs active basis choice with a half-wave plate [27],
then the light passes through a polarizer (to determine
the bit value) and narrow-band filters before arriving at
silicon single-photon detectors from Micro Photon De-
vices. The detectors have a peak efficiency of 48% at
550 nm, 10 dark counts per second and 30 ps timing res-
olution, which allows temporal exclusion of much back-
ground noise. Given a minimum total loss of 40 dB and
an achievable 1 GHz clock rate, the maximum count rate
seen by each detector is around 20,000 counts per sec-
ond, making losses due to dead time (70 ns) negligible.
The detector events are registered and digitized using a
timetagging module with 156 ps resolution. All these
components are commercially available and many are al-
ready space qualified or undergoing qualification, making
this system practical for satellite applications.
IV. DECOY-STATE PROTOCOL
Weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources based on (up-
conversion of) highly attenuated lasers are attractive for
QKD; however, because of the Poissonian statistics of
photon number in laser pulses, some pulses will have
more than one photon and be subject to the photon
number splitting attack [28]. In this attack, an adver-
sary Eve splits off one photon from the pulse and stores
it to measure only after the legitimate party Bob reveals
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FIG. 1. Simplified schematic of QKD system for high loss link. Alice’s up-conversion photon source produces photons at 532 nm
which are sent through the controllable-loss channel to Bob’s receiver.
his measurement basis. Eve then measures in the correct
basis, and so gains full information about multi-photon
pulses without leaving a trace. To combat this attack,
the decoy-state protocol was introduced [29, 30], wherein
Alice changes the average photon number of randomly
interspersed pulses from the signal level µ to the decoy
level ν. Since Eve cannot know whether a given pulse
is a signal or decoy pulse, the decoy pulses allow much
better bounds on how much information Eve has gained
from multiphoton signals, and thus how much privacy
amplification must be performed. The asymptotic key
rate (adapted from Ref. [21]) per laser pulse obtainable
from a decoy pulse protocol is
R ≥ q Nµ
Nµ +Nν
{−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2(e1)]},
(1)
where q = 1/2 is the basis reconciliation factor, Qµ
is the signal gain, i.e. the ratio of Bob’s detections to
pulses sent by Alice for average photon number µ, Eµ is
the quantum bit error rate for signal pulses, f(Eµ) = 1.22
is the error correction efficiency for practical error correc-
tion codes, H2(x) = −x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the
binary entropy function, and Q1 and e1 are the estimated
gain and error rate for single photon pulses. The factor
Nµ
Nµ+Nν
is added since only detections of the signal state
µ contribute to the final key, and Nµ/ν is the number of
signal/decoy detections. The key rate is then the gain of
single-photon pulses, less the error correction on all sig-
nal pulses, less the privacy amplification on single-photon
pulses. Note that this key rate should be multiplied by
the laser pulse rate to obtain secure key bits per second.
We chose the two-decoy protocol from Ref. [21]. In
this protocol, Alice sends randomly a signal pulse with
average photon number µ, a decoy pulse with average
photon number ν < µ, or the vacuum. In our case, to
illustrate the utility of the two-decoy method, we took
the vacuum as being sent between adjacent laser pulses.
Q1 and e1 were therefore calculated from Section D of
Ref. [21], allowing a final secure key rate from equation
(1).
4V. TIMING SYNCHRONIZATION
Since the clock periods at Alice and Bob will inevitably
drift, a synchronization based on the sent and received
signals had to be devised. As seen in Fig. 2, the timetag-
ging clock at Bob may drift hundreds of nanoseconds rel-
ative to the laser clock (period = 13 ns) at Alice. As an
example, if the laser clock period is shortened by only 1 fs,
the clocks will be offset by 76 ns after one second, mak-
ing signal identification impossible. Therefore, timing
synchronization between Alice and Bob is necessary, and
is accomplished here by timetagging a frequency-divided
version of the laser clock, following rough (∼ns) align-
ment with GPS signals. Additionally, a known pseudo-
random sequence could be inserted to allow absolute time
alignment if required [10]. Bob then sends his timetags to
Alice who uses her timetagged laser clock signal to stretch
or compress portions of Bob’s detection timetags depend-
ing on the fluctuations as caused by cavity length changes
in the laser or drifts in the timetagger’s clock. Thus Alice
can identify which tags to keep based on timing and relay
this information to Bob. This could be performed over
the classical communication channel, and since only de-
tection times and not bit or basis values are revealed, no
information is leaked to Eve. In the satellite application,
we must also consider the fast movement of the satel-
lite towards or away from the base station. It becomes
necessary to know precisely the position of the satellite
through orbit analysis and direct time-of-flight measure-
ments, which provide a smoothly varying ground-satellite
time-of-flight function [31]. In post processing, Alice can
then align Bob’s timetags every second by applying the
smooth time offset and searching for a coincidence peak
with her laser clock’s timetags. We estimate that with a
1 GHz clock rate and the worst case of 57 dB total loss,
Bob would receive approximately 800 legitimate signals
each second, more than sufficient for the time synchro-
nization procedure.
VI. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
PERFORMANCE
Our main results are summarized in Fig. 3. Using our
experimental setup, the detection rate and quantum bit
error rate (QBER = Eµ) in each of the rectilinear and di-
agonal bases for signals and decoys were measured and a
final secure key rate from equation (1) was calculated. A
pseudorandom sequence of 256 pulses was repeated and
the resulting timetags formed into a histogram to give
information on each individual pulse state, allowing full
characterization of the system’s capability. The results
versus loss in Fig. 3b, based on many 1000 second data
collection runs at a clock rate of 76 MHz, show secure
key distribution is possible up to 57 dB experimentally.
The secure key generation rate at this maximum 57 dB is
2 bits/s, highlighting the viability of the quantum optics
and detectors required for this high loss. Allowing 6 dB
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FIG. 2. Typically observed drift between Alice’s and Bob’s
clocks. Alice’s clock is determined by the repetition rate of
the mode-locked laser and Bob’s comes from his timetagger.
Drifts in the clock are large compared to the nominal laser
clock period of 13 ns, making timing synchronization a ne-
cessity. Our synchronization scheme correctly aligns Bob’s
detection events independent of which device is drifting.
for receiver and detector efficiency, this permits channel
losses up to 51 dB, higher than any WCP systems previ-
ously built [6–8].
We additionally performed a quantum optical simula-
tion including photon production, channel transmittance
and detection, to predict a secure key rate versus total
loss as shown in Fig. 3b. The simulations show key
generation is possible up to 59 dB and agree with the
experimental results.
To highlight the viability of our system for a satel-
lite uplink, simulations of satellite orbits over one year
were performed to predict the total channel loss versus
passage time of the satellite. Using a realistic orbit at
600 km height, 712 satellite passages over our hypotheti-
cal ground station near Ottawa, Canada were predicted,
about 80% of which have a portion with low enough loss
for QKD (excluding cloudy nights). The total loss ver-
sus time of the overall best single passage and of the 80th
percentile passage are plotted in Fig. 3a. The average to-
tal loss for usable passages for QKD is 52 dB, well within
the capability of our system.
Finally, the total loss versus time for a satellite pas-
sage and secure key rate versus total loss can combine to
produce Fig. 3c, secure key rate versus time for a satel-
lite passage. The rate is given in bits per laser pulse on
the left axis and bits per second on the right, based on
our clock rate of 76 MHz. The curves in Fig. 3c can
be integrated to find total bits of secure key generated
over one passage. For the 80th percentile passage shown
here, a total of 5.7× 104 bits of secure key could be gen-
erated with our 76 MHz system. Additionally, as shown
50 100 200 300 400 500
1
100
10000
10^6
Time (s)
Se
cu
re
 ke
y r
at
e 
(b
its
/s)
 
 
80th percentile
Best
Student Version of MATLAB
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 700
100
200
300
400
500
Loss (dB)
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
 
 
80th percentile
Best
Student Version of MATLAB
a)#Total#loss#versus#-me#due#to#
satellite#movement#
b)#Secure#key#rate#versus#total#loss##
c)#Secure#key#rate#versus#-me#for#a#
single#satellite#passage#
Satellite#simula-on#parameters:#
Low#earth#orbit#(600#km#high)#
712#passages#per#year#
Ground#sta-on:#OFawa,#Canada,#45oN#
25#cm#transmiLng#telescope#
30#cm#receiving#telescope#
532#nm#wavelength#
Satellite#passage#
performance#over#
one#year:#
1 2 
1 4 
106 
1
Time (s) 
S
ec
ur
e 
ke
y 
ra
te
 (b
its
/s
) 
Alice#
Bob#
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7010
−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
1 −1
Total loss (dB)
Se
cu
re
 ke
y r
at
e 
pe
r l
as
er
 p
uls
e
 
 
Experiment
Simulation
Simulated loss (dB) 
FIG. 3. Secure key rate over high loss channel. a) Simulation of total loss versus visible passage time for a satellite uplink.
Here we show simulation data for the best overall passage in that year and, for comparison, the 142nd best passage, i.e. 80th
percentile of the 712 total passages for the year. The loss is minimum as the satellite is closest to the ground station (highest
elevation angle) and increases as the satellite approaches the horizon. b) Experimental results and simulation of secure key
rate versus loss. Our data agree well with the theoretical curve, which uses a quantum optical simulation to predict key rates.
Deviations from the theoretic curve are caused by imperfect alignment of the polarization inside the optical fibers. Treatment
of error analysis is included in QKD security proofs, and is generally based on upper bounding the information given to an
eavesdropper compatible with measurement results. c) Expected secure key rate versus time for a satellite passage, based on
simulations and experimental parameters. The secure key rate in bits/s on the right axis assumes the 76 MHz clock rate of our
source. The loss versus time and secure key rate versus loss curves combine to produce the output key rate over one satellite
passage.
in Fig. 4, our photon source is sufficiently stable for key
generation without active feedback for the duration of a
satellite passage.
When statistical fluctuations [22] and information the-
oretic security proofs [32] are considered, our simulations
predict about 55 dB average loss is permissible over a
single satellite passage with our hardware and an achiev-
able 1 GHz clock rate. Recent work on the finite-key
problem for qubits [33] should allow channel losses to
be extended further (once optical modes are considered),
making a higher number of yearly satellite passages us-
able for QKD.
VII. REMOVAL OF BACKGROUND NOISE
To separate legitimate detections from background
noise, all detections were timetagged (see Appendix for
discussion of timing system), subdivided into 10 ms long
sections and then binned with a bin width equal to a
fraction of the laser clock cycle. Then the detections
from the QKD source should be tightly peaked around
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FIG. 4. Stability of secure key rate (solid line) and QBER
(dashed line). Data were taken at 30 dB total loss over 1000 s,
and the mean secure key rate and QBER are 7560±24 bits/s
and 1.85 ± 0.03 % respectively. The small drifts are likely
due to temperature fluctuations which alter the polarization
transformation in the connecting optical fibers.
the laser pulse times with a width determined by the jit-
ter [34], and the background noise distributed randomly.
The true signals were separated from dark counts and
stray light by choosing an optimal window width around
the peaks, which narrows with increasing loss as more
background counts must be excluded to maintain an ac-
ceptable QBER (Fig. 5). Only timetags within the win-
dow contribute to the final key calculations, and those
outside are discarded. The number of erroneous back-
ground counts per second that are included in the raw
key is given by
Cerrors = W × r × Cbkgd, (2)
where W is the timing window, r is the laser repeti-
tion rate, and Cbkgd is the total number of background
counts per second. The final key rate given by equation
1 depends on both QBER and raw key rate, leading to
the optimal timing windows as noted in Fig. 5c. The
optimal timing window decreases from 2 ns at low loss,
to 40 ps at 57 dB, making full use of the good timing
afforded by our system, and displaying the linear drop in
QBER due to Cerrors as W narrows.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the design and viability of a
QKD system capable of operation under ultra-high chan-
nel losses of up to 57 dB. Our system therefore satis-
fies the challenging requirements for uplink of quantum
keys to a satellite, and future improvements will allow
the technical requirements to be satisfied with full in-
formation theoretic security. As noted above, a space-
based quantum receiver is less demanding than a quan-
tum source, as all required components for the receiver
have flown in space [35], so a near-term satellite mission
using our approach as a prototype is possible.
The still outstanding challenges for a full-scale QKD
satellite mission include determining sufficient classical
processing and communication bandwidth and designing
a reference frame system to compensate for the slow ro-
tation of the satellite [36, 37], which will be our next
steps of research. Additionally, how best to deal with a
strongly fluctuating channel while maintaining security
is an open question [14, 38, 39]. As a first step, we simu-
lated secure key rate versus loss, comparing a static chan-
nel to a fluctuating channel with log-normal probability
density function [40]. We found no difference in secure
key rate even for strongly turbulent atmosphere, so long
as the average channel loss was the same. Additionally,
putting tighter bounds on the finite-key problem for re-
alistic implementations is a great challenge for theorists,
to enable the use of lossier channels than ever [33, 41].
Our system must be updated to include a truly random
pulse sequence on Alice’s side, and a receiver on Bob’s
side capable of measuring in both rectilinear and diag-
onal bases simultaneously with passive basis choice. To
bring our system to the desired 1 GHz clock rate is not
difficult, as the modulators can handle a few GHz and
the upconversion process is clock rate independent. We
would simply require a mode-locked laser with shorter
cavity length and updated electronics.
Finally, with a quantum receiver in space and a suit-
able photon source, a number of additional quantum
physics experiments over ground-space distance become
viable, including teleportation and entanglement swap-
ping [42], fundamental tests of quantum mechanics [43],
and tests of new physical theories [44]. In addition, an
entangled photon source which emits one photon around
the desired 532 nm is envisaged for the future [45, 46].
This photon would be directed to the satellite while the
other photon of the entangled pair would be in the tele-
com band around 1550 nm, suitable for long-distance
transmission in optical fibers. A central ground sta-
tion containing the source could be connected locally by
fibers to end-users, and globally via satellite to another
such ground station. Furthermore, it is possible that the
uplink transmission can be enhanced by implementing
wave-front corrections of the transmitted optical beam,
through adaptive optics [47]. This technology is used
in astronomic observation, and could be realized at the
ground station even once the mission is deployed. In
summary, the future for QKD using satellites is bright,
the uplink is demonstrably feasible, and in the near term
we expect to see multiple satellite missions for quantum
information, both for fundamental science and applica-
tions.
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FIG. 5. Raw key rate (all signal detection events), secure key rate, and quantum bit error rate (QBER) versus timing window
from experimental data. a) At 40 dB total loss, b) At 54 dB total loss. Note that raw key rate and QBER both increase with
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case and 0.4 ns for the 54 dB case, as the benefit of increasing the raw key rate is offset by the detriment of increasing the
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Appendix: Receiver timing system
In practical QKD systems, the use of timing informa-
tion is necessary to exclude illegitimate detections [19].
Our system employs free-running detectors and timetags
every detection event, in contrast to gated detection
schemes which only open detectors during the specified
arrival time of a pulse. Both are subject to detector
control attacks [48–50] with most effort being focused
on gated avalanche photodiodes for telecom applications
[51]. For satellite applications, the timetagging method
is preferable as it requires much less data transmission.
A recent precise timing experiment [52] required every
gate pulse to be sent classically in parallel to the quan-
tum channel from Alice to Bob, a vast overhead which is
impractical for space applications, due to both fast and
slow changes in optical path length. By contrast, using
the timetagging approach, Bob can send back to Alice
only the timetags generated by his receiver, which will
be small in number due to the high channel loss. Al-
ice can then align them to her source rate and tell Bob
which to keep. As an example, with a clock rate of 1 GHz
Alice would have to send 109 gate pulses per second in-
dependent of the loss for gated operation, while if using
timetags, Bob would have to transmit only about 5000
timetags per second back to Alice for 50 dB t tal loss.
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